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The Flow of Money Capital
Analysis up to this point has been confined to flows of real capital --
to aggregates expressed in terms of constant dollars and considered rep-
resentative, insofar as techniques of deflation permit, of physical quan-
tities. For some purposes actual money flows, unadjusted for price
changes, are of prime importance. This is true in particular of all the
purely financial aspects of railroad capital formation. The impact
of railroad investment upon capital markets, for example, must be
weighed in terms of flows of money.
Since price fluctuations have been sharp, and the general trend
briskly upward since the turn of the century, the initial impression pro-
vided by the statistical portrait of railroad investment, expressed in
current dollars, is radically different from that given in preceding
pages. This difference, moreover, is a real one. Tn money terms the
size of the railroads and the gross flow of its capital expenditures have
followed an upward trend that has persisted through the period be-
tween the two world wars and beyond. Fromthe standpoint of finan-
cial relations, this statement is of significance though, obviously, in the
absence of the analysis of the preceding pages, it could be gravely
misleading.
Throughout the period since 1870 the cost of road and equipment
and the general level of prices fluctuated in rough consonance, but
with one important and fairly consistent difference. The cost of road
and equipment grew higher relative to general prices. Thus, from the
I 870's to the nuid-1890's the wholesale price index of the U. S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics declined by about 40 per cent; the average price of
the goods and services employed for railroad construction and equip-
ment dropped by only 25 per cent. Correspondingly, the rise from the
rnid-l890's to the 1920's amounted to 100 per cent for wholesale prices
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but to 150per cent for the cost of roadand equipment. Again,the subsequent decline to thel930's was about 30per cent for wholesale prices but notmore than 20 per cent forroad and equipment.From the 193O's to thepost World \yar IIyears, however, the risewas about 100 per cent in bothcases. Over the entire eighty-yearspan the cost of road and equipmentmore than tripled, whilewholesale prices barely doubled.
The record of themoney value of the fixedcapital of the railroads reflects this generally briskupward trend in thecost of road and equip-
ment, together with changesin the stock of realcapital. To besure, during the firsttweny-five years covered bythis study, pricestended downward moderatelyand partlycounterbalanced the fastpace of real capitalaccumulation in this period;the money valueof fixed capital advanced from$4 billion in 1870to about $6 billion in1897, as shown in Chart 8, whilethe quantity of realcapital in thesameperiod roughly doubled. But in immediately subsequent years the corn-
bmation of a growth of about 30 per cent in real capital, a steady rise
in prices during the early years of the twentieth century, and the infla-
tion during and immediately following World War I, catapulted the
currcnt dollar value of the railroads' stock of fixed capital from $6
billion in 1897 to $24 billion iii1922 -a quadnipling in twenty-five
years. From1922through1935a small net increase in real capital
was overshadowed by tobogganing prices, but the inflation of World
War II and the succeeding years resulted in another sharp boost in
values. At the halfway mark of the twentieth century the total valuc
of road and equipment in current dollars was at a new high of $36
billion.12
The close connection between the real stock of capital and real net
capital formation, noted in Section 2 above, does not exist when these
quantities are expressed in current dollars. For a price change will of
course alter the money value of road and equipment, either upward
or downward, even in the absence of net capital expenditures. The
trend of the latter series cannot be derived from the former, as would
be the case if the influence of prices were eliminated. Net capital ex-
penditures in current dollars are depicted in Chart9,and it will be
noted that the picture given here is also quite different from that
observed in the real capital series, though not so dramatically diverse
as was the case for the stock of capital.
Of particular interest is the fact that the volume of net capital cx-
penditurcs reached in the mid-i920'swas about the same as that at
the peak fifteen years earlier and considerably greater than all previous
peaks. Again, the annual average of $165 million in net capital ex-
penditures during the five years centered in 1948 is not far under the
volumes reached in the greatest years of railroad growth in 1882 and
1891.
u It may be of srnnc intcrest to note the behavior of the value of railroad assets in
relationship to the general level of prices. This may be done roughly by deflating
the current value of road and equipment by the Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale
price index, converted to a 1929 =100 base. The results would show the "purchasing
power" of railroad assets in terms of commodities in general, at wholesale. In these
terms the value of road and equipment rose from about $5 billion in 1872 to $12
billion in 1897 and to $24 billion in the early 1930's, then declined so $21 billion
at the close of the 1940's. This pattern is a "dampened" modification of that followed
by the real stock of capital series discussed in Section 2.
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But in thegross capital CXJ)efldituresseries, also shown inChart 9, thepronounced downward trendnoted earlier in realcapital formation is Completelyreversed. The peaksreached in 191 1 andin 1925 arc successively greater thanany that had gonebefore, and thatreached at the end of the194O's tops them allby a substantialmargin. Annual gross capital expendituresin the fiveyears centered in 1948anlounte(f to $1,050 million,compared with annualaverages of not muchmore than $300 millionwhen theexpansion of railroadfacilities was at its height in the earlyyears of the 1880's andof the 189O's. The sharply andprogressively wideninggap between net andgross capital expenditures,observed in the chart,is of particularimportance For thisgap represents capital





0,effects of the upward drift until 1931 of the real capital of the rail-
roads and, particularly ir recent years, the sharp rise in prices. Ever
since thc start of World War I, capital requirements for rep1ar'n1enf
have exceeded those for expansion and improvement and ultimately
dwarfed them. Even in the post-World War II years of greatest outlays
--the five years centered in 1948capital consumption averaged
$887 million per year against only $166 million for net capital cxpencli-
tures. It is thus clear that so long as the railroads maintaintheir present
size, they will exercise a significant influence in the magnitude of the
nation's aggregate gross flow of funds into investment goods. On the
other hand, in the absence of additional net growth in total railroad
facilities their impact on capital markets would be limited to that stem-
ming from the possible inability of some roads to finance all replace-
ments internally, the possible shifts in relative importance of. say, west-
ern and eastern roads, and the repercussionsof refinancing operations.
Sources and Uses of Funds
Although railroad capital formation is of less importance in the total
economy now than it was in earlier periods, thereis little question that
the railroads' demand for capital weighed heavily in the nation's aggre-
gate. Tables 10 and 11 indicate how these huge capitalrequirements
were financed and the uses towhich they were nut. In general, the
data in both tables summarize the events of periods ranging from five
and one-half to fourteen years. Accordingly, trends which progress only
for shorter periods are obscured occasionally. Titus if railroads issued
bonds in the fIrst few years of one of these spans and in the remaining
years redeemed bonds, only the netbalance of these opposing move-
ments would appear in the tables. Similarly, the analysissummarizes
the activities of railroads in the aggregate; though some roads may
have sold securities while others purchased them in agiven period,
only the net results of the diverse activities are shown.
More concretely, several of the detailed series required for the cus-
tomary "sources and uses" analysis arclacking in the period prior to
World War I, and hence the data of Table 10 were derived simply by
calculating the difference in corresponding balance sheet items during














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0this procedure ma' be found in revisions iii properEy valuations --
particularly writeups - winch were especially pronounced Prior to
1907. After that date they were limited, though not eliminated, by
both underlying economic conditions and ICC regulations.
Distortions arising from writeups may be expected to appear pri-
marily on the uses side in "investment in road and equipment" and
on the sources side in "securities outstanding" and "surplus." Fortu-
nately, with the aid of data previously derived, the magnitude of this
error may be roughly estimated. Since retirements were extremely
small in the pre-World \Tar I period, the change in the substantially
undepreciated road and equipment account may be interpreted as an
approximation of gross capital expenditures. The estimates of gloss
capital expenditures (including land) derived in our study of capital
formation amount to $2,750 million from July 1880 to June 1890 and
$3,069 from July 1893 to June 1907, respectively 22 per cent and 25
per cent less than the corresponding items in Table 10. These dis-
crepancies, broadly, ma)' be taken as estimates of the net writeups in
these periods. From July 1907 to December 1916 our figure for gross
capital expenditures is $5,482 million, less than 4 per cent in excess of
the corresponding itemof Table 10. This small discrepancy reflects the
declining importance of revisions in the valuations of real property
after 1907, the growing magnitude of retirements, and, of course, statis-
tical errors in each of the series compared.
The effect of changes in valuation, both upward and downward,
have in the main been eliminated from the data in Table 11, for in
this case estimated series on gross capital expenditures, retained profits,
and net new issues of securities have been incorporated directly. The
remaining errors relate principally to noncash transactions such as
claims and counterclaims between the federal government and the
railroads following World War I; though an effort was made to ex-
clude these, it was possible to do so only imperfectly. Since, for the
most part, sources and uses for the period 1914-1949 were inde-
pendently estimated, the discrepancies given in the last row of Table
11 casts some light on the magnitude of remaining errors. These dis-
crepancies in the four subperiods of the table amount to 12, 25, 1,
and 6 per cent respectively.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1prirnarilfor the detectionof major trcndsand for theobservation of the broaderproportionate relationsamong the con)poflPfltS.Fine dif- fcrcnces iiiust clearlybe ignored. Inconnection with theabsolute levels of the figures itshould be notedthat the data inTable 10are based upon U.S. Bureau ofthe Census andICC compilations,which cov- ered from 96to 99 per ccnt ofthe total assets ofall railroads,and that thc data in Table11 refer onlyto Class I roadsor Class I and lessors, which representedfrom 75 to 92per cent of the totalassets. Throughout thisstudy the obviousimplication hasbeen made that the bulk of thegross investment ofthe railroads,both during their period of maximumgrowth and later,was for fixed capital.Tables it) and 11 providethe underlyingdata for thisjudgment. In theyears from 1880through 1916,inventory accumulationnever aCCOUfltC(l for more than 3p' cent, of the totaluses of funds, againstfrom 74 to more than 100per cent for expenditureson road and equipment.Only in thespan from 1914to 1920, whichcovers the war andpostwar inflations, (lidinventory investmentloom large,accounting for 15per cent of alluses, though this risewas followed byliquidation duringthe next two decades.During the entirespan from 1914to 1949, invest- ment in road andequipment accountedfor more than95 per cent of total uses andinventory accumulationfor only 2per cent. Expendi- tures for miscellaneous
physical property- mines, timber lands,and other non railroadproperty -- have inthe main beenrelatively small in the totaldispositions offunds; suchinvestments reachedsignificant proportions10 per centonly in the1830-1890 period.3 Among thefinancial dispositionsof fundsmay be noteda fairly steady accumulationof cash anddeposits thatpersistedeven through the 1920's and1930's, whenthe volume ofbusiness waseither steady or declining, andreached 10per cent of alluses with theupsurge in traffic in the1940's.
In broadestoutline, the flowof funds intotheir varioususes re- mained in fairlysteady proportionsthroughout theperiod 1880-1949. Expenditures forroad and equipmentwere at all timesthe most impor- tant by avery substantialmargin, inventorychangeswere usually
In Table 10,where they arenot slmowscparatcly, theseinvestments comprisethe
bulk of the itemin line 3,except for the period
1893-1907, whenthey are included
in line 4.
46among the smallest items, and so on.No such stability is to be found
itt the soun us side of the tables. I Icrc thcrc. wcrc sigaificaut trendsthat
apparently persisted throughout the tittie SI)afl covcrcd iiitlra(liCall)
altered the pattern of financing.
Thus in the earliest interval, internal financing of investments was
virtually absent. 1)epreciation charges wcrc almost entirely lacking.'
Rctaiiicd profits -reflected in "surplus"accountcd for only 2 per
cent of capital requirements. The bulk of all requirements wereob-
tained from capital markets --- about 50 per cent from the sale of
bonds and 40 per cent from stocks. Short-term credit l)rovi(le(l the
remaining 7 per cent of all funds in this period. This swift absorption
of money capital front external sources was, to he sure, interrupte(l l)y
the depression of the mid-eighties and even more by that of the mid-
nineties, which was marked by the failure of several important rail-
roads. Numerous securities, at such times, were temporarily indefault,
the amount of bonded indebtedness involved reaching a peak of$700
million in 1 894.But such setbacks were relatively short-lived. In the
aggregate the railroads sought and successfully obtainednearly all
the funds required from I 1180 through 1907 from long-term capital
markets.
By 191)7-1916 a pronounced change in this picture had already
begun. Depreciation accounting, although still incomplete, had grown
more popular, in large part becauseof a ruling on this subject by the
ICC in 1907. Hence tlepreciation charges provided in excessof 10 per
cent of all funds in this period. Retained profitsalso had become a
highly important source of investment funds, accounting for almost 30
per cent of the total. Thus roughlytwo-fifths of the capital require-
ments were internally financed in this period --- a spanwhich, inci-
dentally, covered some of the years of greatest investment in railroad
history. The reduction in the relative importance ofexternal financing
"The zero depreciation recorded in the periods 1880-1890 and 1893-1907in 'I'abic
10 is an approximation.
The figure of $700 million is the peak value of bonds upon which interest wasin
default in this period. Most of these bonds later resir,ed their value and wereulti-
mately redeemed. I lowever, according toPoor's i(anual of Railroads in the United
States, 1900,a total of$191riijllioii in stocks arid ItoriIs were written off as worthless
in flfty-seven reorganized collipanies daring I 884-1 89!). As a group,nevertheless, the
fifty-seven companies had a greater value of stocks and bondsoutstanding at the
end of this period (after re-organization) titan they did at thebeginning.
47was manifested primarilyin the sale ofstocks and onlymodestly in 1)011(1 financing;together theseSOUrCeS pro1ed lessthan two-thirdsof the aggregatefunds raised in1907-1916 afterthe gross changesin securities outstandingis corrected loupurchases and salesby affiliated oiiipame and otheriiitca-industrysecurity transactions. The trendsalready notedwere intensified insucceedingyears, as Table ii shows.They reachedtheir climax inthe forties whenthe totality of capitalrcquirementswas internally financed.Indeed, apor- tion of retainedprofits was employedto reduce, by substantialamounts, both bondedindebtednessand equity securitiesoutstanding. In the thirties internalfinancing alsoprovided for almostall capital require- ments, but suchfunds wereobtained in substantialpart from wide- spread defaultson bonded indebtedness.The total valueof funded debt of Classroads and theirlessors that maturedin that decadeand remained unpaidwas somewhat inexcess of $1 billion;defaulted in- terest chargesaggregated anadditional $1billion. Reorganizationslcd to permanentwritedowns formany of theseobligations; but inthe following decadethe sharp risein business liftedrevenue well above the level requiredto meetexpenses, obligations,and new capitalre- quirementsas well. It may benoted thatshort-term credit,which in general had beenemploycdvery modestly,was also liquidatedin the two decadesfollowing 1920,though someincrease followedin the forties.
This broad shiftin favor ofinternal financingis a manifestationof the trend towardincreasing cautionwhich hasaccounted fora similar change in financingpatterns inmany other industries.Internal financ- ing bearsno accounting chargesand leavesactual obligation- to creditors or equityshareholdersunchanged. In thecase of the rail- roads, howcver,there were alsospecific factorsat work. Thusdeprecia- tion accountinghad been usedby the railroadsmore sparinglythan by most otherindustries; onlysince 1943have depreciationcharges been made forroad as svcllas for equipment.This shift aloneaccounted for a considerableportion of therise in therelative importanceof internal financing.15Second, inan industry inwhich theaverage life ' Of course thereis no intentionhere to suggestthat the adoptionof depreciation accounting necessarilyincreases internalfinancing. Thereare, however,many obvious motivations for keepingdividend paymentswithin the limitsof reportednet income,
at least over thelonger period, anddepreciation chargesarc a deductionfrom
reported net income.
48of capital is about fifty years, the sharp price riseof the 1940's had an
cspcciallv significant iiufiueiice upon the fundsrequired for replace-
ment. Even if full (1c1)rcciation charges1)asC(l on original .tmt) had
hccn made throughout the period, they wouldhave fallcn far short of
the amounts flCC(IC(l for keeping the stock ofcapital intact. Financing
replacements from undistrihuted profits under these urcumStallCcSis
one way of correcting for thelimitations of conventional accounting
mcthods during periods of sharp pnrises. Third, since World WarI
the growth of the railroads had been increasinglylimited, and ulti-
matel)' halted, by competitIve transportation. Thedarkened 1)rospect
- or at least greateruncertainty - of the future long-term trend of
railroad traffIc provided further grounds for reluctance toenlarge obli-
gations, either to holders of l)011(tS or equities.Iinally, tliotigli more
study in this area is needed to justify conclusions,it is possible that the
structure of corporate and personal income taxesis a factor which has
encouragedl corporate in(lustry in general to reinvest alarger propor-
tion of its profits.
On the other hand, it should not be concluded thatrailroads arc
destined to play a minor role in capital markets of thefuture. Though
the trend toward internal financing is hardly tobe questioned, the fig-
ures for the decade of the forties may exaggerateits extent. I)uring the
war years the liquidity position of most roadsimproved! swiftly as earn-
ings mounted and material restrictions severely limited newinvestment
and replacements. Liquid assets thus accumulated wereemployed to
meet the capital requirements of the postwar years.However, in the
period after 1946,currentearnings alone were insufficient to meet all
these requirements. Moreover, even though railroadsin the aggregate
reduced their obligations during this decade, a fewiiidividiial roads
expanded their stocks and boiids outstanding and, in general,refinanc-
ing operations were extensive. In all, between January1, 1941, and
December 31, 1949, railroads issued bonds, includingequipment trust
obligations, with face value aggregating nearly $5 billion.As Table 11
shows, of course, the value of such securities extinguished bythe rail-
roads in that period exceeded this amount.
49